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Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

ADVISOR 2.0: ADVANCING THE MILITARY TRANSITION TEAM MODEL


SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

by

Major Joseph W. Jones


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Executive Summary

Title: ADVISOR 2.0: ADVANCING THE MILITARY TRANSITION TEAM MODEL

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Thesis: As a subset element of the Military Transition Team (MTT) organization the battalion level advisor team is critical to the success of transitioning to Iraqi control. The battalion level United States Marine Corps Military Transition Team (USMC MTT), as organized, trained, educated, is inadequate to meet some current and future operational requirements.

Discussion: As a subset element of the Military Transition Team (MTT) organization the battalion level advisor team is critical to the success of transitioning to Iraqi control. The battalion level United States Marine Corps Military Transition Team (USMC MTT), as organized, trained, educated, is inadequate to meet some current and future operational requirements.

The understanding of critical advisor capabilities is directly proportional to the amount of academic study dedicated to the discipline. The foundational educational importance to advising is valued and advocated in the development of the MTT, although not directed. The academic approach, which is a part of the educational approach to learning, is not specifically required in the context of USMC MTT progression. No formal education exists.

From the beginning, through the I MEF's current stage training course, the focus is in combat skills, specifically those warfighting functions (maneuver, logistics, force protection) that preserve that USMC MTT.

True, real, and focused advisor capabilities are foundational to achieving success. In order to do this the organization structure, education, and training of the battalion MTT must change. This change does not represent removal or reduction of the current concept, but signals an expansion of present content and the introduction of mission essential content.

Conclusion: In the current counterinsurgency fight, or future full-scale conventional operations, the USMC MTT requires effective organization, education, and training. With the advances made, the educational and training conditions are set to make USMC MTT employment most effective. With the proper organization, and solid academics, the training schedule balanced between combat skills and advising theory will produce the most effective USMC MTT. The idea of completely mission ready and broadly capable military transition teams is only truly possible when the advising model has evolved.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

The Military Transition Team that are operating in places like Iraq and Afghanistan have been tasked as the “Main Effort” in the Strategic effort to transition security and stability responsibilities from US forces to the indigenous forces. As a former Military transition team leader I spent 6 months training for this mission and 7 months in execution. My team embraced the concept of “teach, coach, and mentor” for our interaction with our Iraqi counterparts and performed comparatively well during our deployment. However, I re-deployed with a sense of professional incompleteness. I thought that there was more I could have done to advisor my Iraqi battalion commander in his development and the readiness of his unit given a stronger foundation in advising.

The differences in education and training standards for the Marine Corps Military Transition teams are very noticeable. I directly witnessed the diversity of education and training standards related to the preparation and performance. The overall process was not very impressive. As a Marine, and likely a future advisor, I thought a detailed discussion on the issues surrounding the development of advisor teams is important. I would like to see the current conflicts we are in resolved. If our military leaders are intent on using the transition team concept to facilitate strategic victory then the building of advisors is fundamental and key, thus I hope my contribution to this case is valuable.

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"America's task in Iraq is not only to defeat an enemy, it is to give strength to a friend – a free, representative government that serves its people and fights on their behalf."

– President George W. Bush, May 24, 2004

Introduction

The *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 2005* articulates the plan to develop the Armed forces of Iraq in order to provide security for the country. Along the "Security Track" the document states that "the training, equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces will produce an army and police force capable of independently providing security and maintaining public order in Iraq."¹ The strategy is based on the logic that "coalition transition teams are embedded in all Iraqi Army battalions to provide assistance and guidance when needed."² This concept further assumes that military transition teams are capable of executing the tasks of the transition mission. The battalion level United States Marine Corps Military Transition Team (USMC MTT), as organized, trained, educated, is inadequate to meet current and future operational requirements as required in the National Strategy.

As a subset element of the Military Transition Team (MTT) organization the battalion level advisor team is critical to the success of transitioning to Iraqi control. The relevant questions are: Does current organizational design, education, training, and employment of Marine Corps Transition Teams best achieve the requirements of effective development of advised foreign forces? Moreover, can training and employment of the MTT facilitate mission transition in Iraq?

Background

In the spring of 2004 the Marine Corps accepted the idea and recognized the operational need for advisors to assist in the development of the indigenous armed forces of Iraq. Specifically, those Iraqi army units that were deployed and employed in the Marine Corps battlespace in Al Anbar Province, Iraq required development, training, and education. The use of military advisors/trainers became an immediate and necessary requirement to support combat operations and set the stage for the transition of security and stability operations in the province. This required the Marine Corps to conceptually design, reorganize, plan, assign, and embed USMC MTTs throughout the army, police, and security forces.

USMC MTTs teach, coach, and mentor indigenous security forces, while providing direct access to partnered unit capabilities such as air and artillery support, medical evacuation, and intelligence.³ The concept for the USMC MTT were based in part on the historical experiences the organization had with foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency. The Marine Corps referenced its experience in the small wars of the 1920's and 30s and the later operations in Vietnam. The Combined Action Platoon program in the Vietnam conflict was the particular concept that most proponents based the argument for the military transition team idea on. In addition, the approaches of T.E. Lawrence formed the intellectual basis of the USMC MTT concept.

With the strategy, direction, operational requirement, and the historical underpinning present, the contemporary USMC MTT has developed and been employed throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. The USMC MTT design, billet structure, and organizational

concept are developed as a function of the operational mission and conditions that exist on these battlefields. The nature and complexity of the current operational environment force the employment of USMC MTTs with robust structure, unique abilities, and more sophisticated skills. These attributes combine to dictate an education and training process that has the goal of producing capable, mission ready, USMC MTT members.

The Current USMC MTT will not Achieve the Goal

The battalion level USMC Military Transition Team (USMC MTT), as organized, trained, educated, is inadequate to meet some current and future operational requirements. As a subordinate element of the USMC MTT organization, at the basic operational unit, the battalion level reflects the strength and weaknesses of the overall advisor effort. The concept for battalion USMC MTT must be advanced and only through the redesign of the team development process can this occur. The weakness in the organization, education, and training of teams limits the overall goals of the transition concept and undermines the overall mission.

The Organizational Structure of the Military Transition Team

The current model of the battalion level USMC MTT is based on an 11 billet structure. It reflects the traditional battalion staff function design. Functional areas in administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and medical support form the base, from which attachments and/or detachments are made. Each team member is expected to have a level of expertise and/or experience in the billet occupational specialty. Short of

this expertise the overall capability of the USMC MTT is diminished and the resultant ability to teach, guide, and direct the security force it serves is limited.

Although the specific rank level can fluctuate based on availability of personnel, the organization seeks to develop the warfighting functions and within the scope of the larger mission. The graphic below illustrates the current configuration for the 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 7th Iraq Army Division MTT (figure 1), a USMC MTT:⁴

2-1-7 MTT Table of Organization




Figure 1

This model is based on the traditional battalion level functional area staff. As form follows function, the organizational design permits the basic level of planning and operations.

The Education of the Military Transition Team

The comprehension of critical advisor capabilities is directly proportional to the amount of academic study dedicated to the disciple. The foundational educational importance to advising is valued and advocated in the development of the MTT, although not directed. The literature dedicated to the imparting of knowledge, developing the positive judgment and creating well-developed wisdom associated with subject of military advising is used, but in an informal way.⁵ The academic approach, which is a part of the educational approach to learning, is not specifically required in the context of USMC MTT progression. No formal education exists.

The recognized weakness in the process for developing USMC MTTs is the lack of foundational study in advisor literature, academic exploration of role and responsibilities for advisors and education in the enduring principles of military advising. Subject to the individual members of the USMC MTT, these three ideas are emphasized, or not. Many volumes on advising are recommended as a part of theoretical preparation for military advising; but these important writings are explored as a personal experience and not as part of a program of study.⁶

The Evolution of Training for Military Transition Teams

In reference to advisor training, Milburn and Lombard argue that "the training phase should prepare the Marine for the unique demands of being an advisor to a foreign military, a mission that will be unlike any other he has had to face during his career."⁷

The implied intent of this comment is that the outcome of the training program is an advisor that's skilled and capable in the theoretical and practical aspects of advising.

The evolution of training for USMC MTT is illustrative of this idea. At the time of the employment of the first USMC MTTs in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was in charge of the battlespace in Al Anbar. I MEF developed its initial advisor training in theater and in a somewhat ad-hoc manner. This action was out of operational need and the timeliest way to get needed advisors to the newly formed Iraqi Security Forces.⁸

In the development of the overall USMC advisor effort, four major pipelines have evolved for the training. The Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG), formerly Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU), develop their Foreign Internal Defense skills. During a six month course, which includes a five week "Subject Matter Expert" track, each member of the MSOAG teams receives specialized training.⁹ The Security Assistance and Education Training Center (SCETC) plans, prepares, deploys, sustains, and redeploys training assistance teams and unit level advisors that execute missions not executed by operational forces.¹⁰ The newest organization is the Marine Corps Training Advisor Group (MCTAG), which is an organization to coordinate, form, train and equip Marine Corps advisor and training teams.¹¹ The most well know are the advisor training courses established by each MEF (I, II, and III), specifically supporting Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.

All advisor training establishments include some form of medical, communications, intelligence, weapons, logistics and demolitions training. These basic combat skills are key to general team function and operations. In the MEF's current stage training course, the focus is in combat skills, specifically those warfighting functions (maneuver, logistics, force protection) that preserve the USMC MTT.¹²

A review of the current I MEF USMC MTT training schedules (Appendix A) reveals that the content that is weighted. The majority of training content and time in the schedule is focused on essential combat and combat related skills. The schedule effectively balances the training content that makes the MTT operational as an infantry combat team reflecting the characteristics of operations (mobile, urban, and counter-IED/ambush) in Iraq and Afghanistan. This training schedule is representative of the training course content of II and III MEF, the SCETC advisor course and MCTAG. As a quantitative measure of all courses, 95 percent of training time is allotted combat skills internal to the advisor team.

Advance the Model to Achieve the Goal

As stated above, the national strategic goal of victory in Iraq is based on the security "track" where advising is critical. True, real, and focused advisor capabilities are foundational to achieving success. In order to do this the organization structure, education, and training of the battalion MTT must change. This change does not represent removal or reduction of the current concept, but signals an expansion of present content and the introduction of mission essential content. Relative to the current conflict,

the advance is critical to accomplishing transition to Iraqi security force operational control, as well as, team combat survival in the absence of United States forces.

Organizational Advance

Changing the organizational billet structure will facilitate greater USMC MTT capability to operationally employment forces under advisement. Specifically, it must expand in billet number and function. The organic capability to advise at the subordinate combat unit level (infantry company) and engineering is necessary. The optimal organization will add these advisors in order to teach, coach, and mentor with the commander and battalion staff as well as down the indigenous security force structure.

At the company command level the USMC MTT must evaluate and influence in a direct manner. To do this effectively, company level advisors should be assigned and given the same important role, and have similar responsibilities, to the battalion level team members. This allows for full development of the operational capability of the battalion. The critical lower level infantry skills are taught and directed in support of the overall warfighting mission of the unit.

The combat engineer offers those critical abilities that make combat operations in an urban environment possible. Those same engineering requires that exist for a US or Coalition unit in execution of combat operations are true of an Iraqi unit. In the urban environment of the Iraq conflict construction, explosive, mobility, and counter-mobility

requirements are intense, thus the development of an organic engineering abilities is a force multiplier.

A suggested organizational model that includes the company level infantry and combat engineers is presented below (figure 2):

Advanced USMC MTT Table of Organization




Figure 2

It expands by billet and military occupational specialty capabilities of the USMC MTT.

This organization reflects the operational need for lower unit level proficiency and combat engineering support. At the company level a team is embedded to teach, coach, and mentor the junior officer and enlisted in infantry and basic skills. This team directly assists the USMC MTT leader in the assessment of the overall battalion function and readiness. The combat engineer offers a critical advisor skill, plus the additional benefit of strengthening the staff advisor performance.

Formalized Education

As recognized above, the educational process for the USMC MTT is valued. However, no educational process is in place. The educational process must be developed upon codified advisor theory and integrated as a precursor to the training program for the USMC MTT. This doctrine, or the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives” must be developed.¹³ Much historical battle material, from T.E. Lawrence to current Iraq after action reports to USMC MTT lessons learned documents can form the basis for military advisor doctrine.

The educational cornerstone for USMC MTTs must be a concentration in military advisor studies. This process begins with the formal study and research of any and all available information of the subject. These offer the enduring traits and principles that facilitate, what a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report describes as the transition team’s ability to deal with the advisor challenge¹⁴:

“...to overcome these challenges one must realize that serving as an advisor requires a different skill set than commanding combat units. Advisors must use an indirect approach with their counterparts and display persistence, patience, and communication skills to develop rapport with their Iraqi Army counterparts. TT members must also have the ability to operate in an unstructured environment, often without direct guidance from higher.”

As the reports suggests, the advisor skills are extremely important for success. The traits and principles of good advising are likely more valuable to a USMC MTT than military science of combat skills. The traits and principles provide the basis of organizational success and are critical developing skills in the indigenous counterpart. The combat skills

are about needed organization survival, but don't necessarily translate to mission accomplishment.

As current literature is reviewed and analyzed for enduring traits and principles it should be weighted in the overall USMC MTT development program. This is true of the formal education in advisor training as well as the training schedules that support it. In review of a January 2007 MCCLL Foreign Military Advisor Conference report, which details a broader view, only speaks to revision along administrative, personnel selection, and language.¹⁵ No consideration or recommendations are given to the fundamental aspects of advising. This evidence reinforces an institutional lack of recognition for capabilities inherit for success. This is not to say that combat skills training and/or the vital need to survive in combat is in integral to MTT success, it's really a question of excellence across a range of skills and abilities toward achieving the strategic mission (goal).

In the final analysis, the practical training for the MTT must widen to include the timeless principles of advising, cross-leveling of training instruction, and standardization fundamental concepts. In a September 2006 Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned document titled *Military Transition Team Training: Observations and Lessons*, the individual bias toward combat skills the was expressed in this way, "a recent email from a captain who is serving as a MTT member states that too much time was spent on culture training and not enough on combat related training. The captain's point is not that cultural training is unimportant, but that in a compressed training time frame, it is less important than basic combat skills training."¹⁶ Although extremely important and very

understandable, this mindset is indicative of the desire to survive combat and not necessarily execute as effective advisors.

Training Advancement

Towards an advanced USMC MTT capabilities endstate, the standard training schedule should expand instruction in the theory and practice of advising. In a forum report on the question of including advisor skills in block there is clear and definitive recommends in the affirmative. The topics included leadership, negotiation skills, and group dynamics, yet no additional time is allocated to these critical aspects of advising.¹⁷ An equal to greater amount of training schedule time can be dedicated to manifest the benefit of these very intangible skills. This presumes that a standard collection of advising theory, based in principle, is developed.

The changes recommended above for the education of USMC MTTs must be reflected in the training packages for all advisors. Advisor training must be the platform for the practical application of the formal education. Those critical traits and principles can be tested in training via tactical and operational decision gaming. As Schmitt describes, the games “act to develop implicit understanding. By building a sense of teamwork and a shared way of thinking among members of a unit and become a way of working out informal SOP’s or contingencies”. In the case of training for USMC MTT’s, scenarios can include lessons learned in the educational process. This requires direct and integrated link between the advancement in education and training courses.

Conclusion

In the current counterinsurgency fight, or future full-scale conventional operations, the USMC MTT requires effective organization, education, and training. With the advances made, the educational and training conditions are set to make USMC MTT employment most effective. Additional personnel in the USMC MTT add depth of core skills and broaden the capabilities of the indigenous force under advisement. These core competencies become foundationally stronger with a sound USMC MTT base of education in the principles of advising.

With the proper organization, and solid academics, the training schedule balanced between combat skills and advising theory will produce the most effective USMC MTT. Advising indigenous forces, with the issues of culture, language, and environment influencing progression, takes a level of individual and collective know-how that is superior. This know-how for USMC MTT derived from the content of the education and training process. The richer the content for advising becomes, the greater the impact on advisor core capabilities. The idea of completely mission ready and broadly capable military transition teams is only truly possible when the advising model has evolved.

Appendix A

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
					24 Aug ATG Arrival Day Teams arrive 29 Palms	25 Aug T-Day 1 - Welcome aboard - Safety Brief - PCA - Schedule Review
26 Aug T-Day 2 -TCCC	27 Aug T-Day 3 -TCCC	28 Aug T-Day 4 -TCCC	29 Aug T-Day 5 - Language - Culture - Advisor 101 - Gear Issue	30 Aug T-Day 6 -Language -Culture -Comm Radios	31 Aug T-Day 7 - Comm Radios	1 Sep T-Day 8 - Comm Radios - IED Defeat
2 Sep T-Day 9 - IED Lane - CREW Lane - Comm Prep - Language	3 Sep T-Day 10 - CommEx	4 Sep T-Day 11 - Wpns	5 Sep T-Day 12 - Wpns	6 Sep T-Day 13 - Wpns	7 Sep T-Day 14 - COIN - Advisor 102 - SERE - Wpns Maint	8 Sep T-Day 15 - SERE - Personality Eval
9 Sep T-Day 16 -Mounted Ops -VCCT 1 -HEAT -CVOT	10 Sep T-Day 17 -VCCT 2 -HEAT -CVOT - Urban Lane & MRX Brief	11 Sep T-Day 18 - Personality Feedback - Language - Tm Cmdrs Time	12 Sep T-Day 19 - Tm Cmdrs Time	13 Sep T-Day 20 -Urban Warfare -Urban Lanes	14 Sep T-Day 21 -Urban Lanes	15 Sep T-Day 22 -Urban Lanes
16 Sep T-Day 23 -MRX	17 Sep T-Day 24 -MRX	18 Sep T-Day 25 - Hot Wash -Gear Maint -Gear Turn-In	19 Sep ATG Departure Date -Teams Depart			

I MEF (2 Teams)

II MEF (1 Team)

Team 1: MTT 700 (Div) (32)
Team 2: MTT 720 (Bde) (19)
Team 3: MTT 120 (Bde) (19)

70 men

SUNDAY CHOW HALL HOURS:

Wilson – No change
MCCES – 0800-1100; 1500-1800

WHEN	WHERE	WHAT	WHO	TRAINER	REFERENCE
24 Aug	ATG Arrival Day				
TBD	ATG Compound	Teams arrive 29 Palms	All Teams	S-4	
25 Aug	T-Day 1				
0730-0830	Bldg. 1707	Welcome Aboard	All Teams	Dir/OpsO	
0840-1020	Bldg. 1707	NREA UXO Desert Survival	All Teams	Ops Rep	
1030-1120	Bldg. 1707	PCA	All Teams	Tactics Rep	
1300-1400	ATG Classroom	Schedule Review	OIC, 3 Rep, 4 Rep	3T and 4	
1330-Comp	Camp Wilson	Gear Issue	Tm Log Reps	Tm Leads and Instr Staff	
26 Aug	T-Day 2				
0730-1650	Bldg. 1707	TCCC	Teams 1-3	Med Rep	Brunch
27 Aug	T-Day 3				
0730-1650	Bldg. 1707	TCCC	Teams 1-3	Med Rep	
28 Aug	T-Day 4				
0730-1650	Bldg. 1707	TCCC	Teams 1-3	Med Rep	
29 Aug	T-Day 5				
0730-1120	Bldg. 1707	Language	Teams 1-3	CAOCL	
1230-1420	Bldg. 1707	Culture			
1430-1530	Bldg. 1707	Advisor 101		Ops Rep	
1600-Comp	ATG Compound	Gear Issue		Tm Cmdrs	
30 Aug	T-Day 6				
0730-0920	Bldg. 1707	Language	Teams 1-3	CAOCL	
0930-1120	Bldg. 1707	Culture		CAOCL	
1300-Comp	ATG Classroom MCOTEA Trailer	Comm Procedures and Security Comm CYZ-10/Dagger Comm PRC-119		Comm Rep	
31 Aug	T-Day 7				
0730-1120	ATG Classroom MCOTEA Trailer	Comm PRC-148	Teams 1-3	Comm Rep	
1230-Comp	ATG Classroom MCOTEA Trailer	Comm PRC-150	Teams 1-3	Comm Rep	
1 Sep	T-Day 8				
0700-1120	ATG Classroom MCOTEA Trailer	Comm PRC-117	Teams 1-3	Comm Rep	
1230-Comp	ATG Classroom MCOTEA Trailer	IED Defeat and CREW			

WHEN	WHERE	WHAT	WHO	TRAINER	REFERENCE
2 Sep	T-Day 9				
0600-0830	Camp Wilson IED Lane	IED Lane	Teams 1-3	Comm Rep	
0830-0930	Camp Wilson IED Lane	CREW Lane		Comm Rep	
0930-1200	ATG Classroom	Comm Prep		Comm Rep	
1300-1650	Bldg. 1707	Language		CAOCL	
TBD-Comp	ATG Classroom	Comm Prep		Comm Rep	
3 Sep	T-Day 10				
0600-Comp	Camp Wilson	CommEx	Teams 1-3	Comm Rep	
4 Sep	T-Day 11				
0530-1400	Range 113A	M4/M9/Shotgun	Teams 1-3	Wpns Rep	
1400-Comp	ATG Classroom	Crew-Served Weapons Class		Wpns Rep	
5 Sep	T-Day 12				
0530-1400	Range 113A	Crew-Served Weapons Shoot	Teams 1-3	Wpns Rep	
1400-Comp	ATG Classroom	Foreign Weapons Class		Wpns Rep	
6 Sep	T-Day 13				
0530-1400	Range 113A	Foreign Weapons Shoot	Teams 1-3	Wpns Rep	
1400-Comp	Camp Wilson	Weapons Maintenance	Teams 1-3	Tm Cmdrs	
7 Sep	T-Day 14				
0730-0920	Bldg. 1707	COIN	Teams 1-3	Ops Rep	
0940-1120	Bldg. 1707	Advisor 102		Ops Rep	
1230-1620	Bldg. 1707	SERE		SERE Rep	
8 Sep	T-Day 15				
0730-1120	Bldg. 1707	SERE	Teams 1-3	SERE Rep	
1230-1700	Bldg. 1707	SERE		SERE Rep	
1800-1900	Bldg. 1707	Personality Eval		Dr. Affourtit	
9 Sep	T-Day 16				
0600-1030	ATG Classroom MCOTEA Trailer	Mounted Operations	Teams 1-3	Tactics Rep	
1200-1800	Camp Wilson VCCT Center	VCCT	Teams 1-3	Tactics Rep	
1200-1800	HEAT Simulator	HEAT	Teams 1-3	Wpns Rep	
1200-1800	TA West	CVOT	Teams 1-3	Wpns Rep	
10 Sep	T-Day 17				
0700-1800	Camp Wilson VCCT Center	VCCT	Teams 1-3	Tactics Rep	
0700-1800	HEAT Simulator	HEAT	Teams 1-3	Wpns Rep	
0700-1800	TA West	CVOT	Teams 1-3	Tactics Rep	

WHEN	WHERE	WHAT	WHO	TRAINER	REFERENCE
1900-2000	ATG Classroom	Urban Lane and MRX Brief	Tm Cmdrs and 2ics	Tactics Rep	
11 Sep	T-Day 18				
0730-0900	Bldg. 1707	Personality Eval Feedback	Teams 1-3	Dr. Affourtit	
0910-1000	Bldg. 1707	Intro to Persuasion TTPs		Ops Rep	
1010-1100	Bldg. 1707	Art of Persuasion		Ops Rep	
1230-1620	Bldg. 1707	Language	Teams 1-3	CAOCL	
1900-2359	Acorn Gypsum Ridge	Team Cmdrs Time	Teams 1-3	Tm Cmdrs	
12 Sep	T-Day 19				
0600-1600	Acorn Gypsum Ridge	Team Cmdrs Time		Tm Cmdrs	
13 Sep	T-Day 20				
0700-1120	ATG Classroom	Urban Warfare	Teams 1-3	Tactics Rep	
1300-1800	Range 220	Urban Lanes		Tactics Rep	
14 Sep	T-Day 21				
0600-Comp	Range 220	Urban Lanes	Teams 1-3	Tactics Rep	
15 Sep	T-Day 22				
0600-Comp	Range 220	Urban Lanes	Teams 1-3	Tactics Rep	
16 Sep	T-Day 23				
0600-Comp	Range 220	MRX	Teams 1-3	All Reps and Shops	
17 Sep	T-Day 24				
0600-Comp	Range 220	MRX	Teams 1-3	All Reps and Shops	
18 Sep	T-Day 25				
0730-0920	Bldg. 1707	Hot Wash	Teams 1-3	ATG Ops	
1100-Comp	Camp Wilson	Gear Maint/Turn-In		ATG S-4	
19 Sep	ATG Depart Day				
TBD	ATG Compound	Teams depart 29 Palms	Teams 1-3	ATG S-4 & MVSD	

Endnotes

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